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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920576-CA 
v. I 
DOUGLAS A. CATTELAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a denial of defendant's "Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence" arising from defendant's conviction 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
"Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence" on the ground that a five 
years-to-life sentence of imprisonment is the legal sentence for 
an aggravated robbery conviction? This is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Babbel. 813 P.2d 86, 
87-88 (Utah 1991), cert, denied. 112 S.Ct 883 (1992); Scharf v. 
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel 
in entering his negotiated guilty plea? To establish an 
ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show that his counsel 
rendered a deficit performance in some demonstrable manner and 
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U-S- 668, 692 (1984)). 
This presents a mixed question of law and fact. State 
v. Temolin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 823 
P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court's factual 
findings must be given deference on appeal and only set aside if 
clearly erroneous; its legal conclusion is reviewed for 
correctness. Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of 
the issues in this case: 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1990). Aggravated Robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
considered to be "in the course of committing a 
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1990). Robbery. 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601 (1990). Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to 
this title: 
. . . 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury, or a 
facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use 
of the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1990). Felony Conviction -
Indeterminate term of imprisonment - Increase of 
sentence if firearm used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, 
for a term at not less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which 
may be for life but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony# the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, 
for a term at not less than one year nor more than 
15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm 
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm 
was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run 
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consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; 
• • • 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was 
used or involved in the accomplishment of the 
felony and is convicted of another felony when a 
firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment 
of the felony shall/ in addition to any other 
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an 
indeterminate term to be not less than five nor 
more than ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in separate informations with the 
April 1990 aggravated robbery of a 7-Eleven convenience store and 
the May 1990 aggravated robbery of a Texaco Short Stop store (R. 
2, 27). While the two cases (district ct. nos. 901900317 and 
901900318) were never formally consolidated, they were jointly 
considered by the trial court (R. 16, 19, 23, 28-33, 36-37, 47, 
137). 
On July 16, 1990, defendant entered negotiated guilty 
pleas, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), 
to the aggravated robbery of the 7-Eleven, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), and to a 
reduced charge of robbery of the Texaco Short Stop, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990) 
(R. 28-33, 122-138). Defendant was sentenced to the applicable 
statutory terms of imprisonment which sentences were stayed and 
defendant was placed on probation under specified terms and 
conditions (R. 36-37, 38, 39-41). No appeal was taken. 
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In May 1991 defendant admitted to violating the terms 
of his probation and probation was revoked (R. 44, 46-47). 
Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for five years-to-life on 
the aggravated robbery conviction and one-to-fifteen years on the 
robbery conviction; the sentences were imposed concurrently (R. 
46-47). No appeal was taken. 
Five months later, defendant filed a "Motion to Correct 
an Illegal Sentence," asserting that his aggravated robbery 
sentence was illegal arid that the judgment and sentence should be 
reduced to robbery (R. 52, 53-71). The trial court denied the 
motion in a memorandum decision (R. 74-76). 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the 
denial of the motion (R. 147). The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the matter to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Douglas Cattelan, worked for the Internal 
Revenue Service for nineteen years, serving as a section manager 
for seven of those years (R. 25). For at least two years prior 
to his arrest in this case, defendant drank alcohol excessively 
and consumed large amounts of Robitussin cough syrup (R. 25). 
Late at night on April 24, 1990, defendant robbed a 7-
Eleven convenience store (R. 27, 114). Using the telephone just 
outside the store, defendant called the store clerk and demanded 
that he put money in a bag and leave it outside next to a 
dumpster (R. 102, 114). Defendant told the clerk, "If you 
cooperate and don't panic, no one will get hurt. I have a 
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shotgun pointed at your head" (R. 102, 127). The clerk explained 
that he only had $20.00 in the till but asked if defendant wanted 
something else. Defendant responded, "Listen [expletive deleted] 
I do have a gun pointed at your head, and I will kill you if you 
don't do what I ask" (R. 102, 114-20, 127). The clerk quickly 
filled a bag with money and merchandise and left it outside as 
directed (R. 102, 114). He never observed defendant (id.). 
Approximately one week later on May 2, 1990, defendant 
robbed a Texaco Short Stop store. Defendant picked up a box of 
Robitussin cough syrup and walked over to the store's counter. 
His hand was in his pocket and held in a way to appear to be a 
gun (R. 60). Nervous and shaking, defendant asked for all the 
money in the till (R. 60, 62, 64). When the clerks did not 
respond, defendant said, "Give me all the [expletive deleted] 
money. All the [expletive deleted] money — hurry up 'cause I'm 
very nervous, too" (R. 62). The clerks gave him the money in the 
till (R. 60). 
Defendant was arrested the same day and confessed to 
both robberies (R. 9, 114-20; Br. of Appellant at 2-3). In 
connection with the 7-Eleven robbery, defendant claimed that he 
had not told the clerk that he had a shotgun but admitted that he 
got the clerk to comply by telling him that he would not get hurt 
if he cooperated (R. 114-15). 
Defendant initially entered not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of insanity pleas (R. 14). Alienists were appointed to 
examine defendant both for competency to stand trial and for any 
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mental illness defense (R. 16). After these examinations were 
completed, defendant did not further assert an insanity defense 
and no issue relating to these examinations is raised on appeal. 
Plea negotiations were initiated. The State was 
willing to reduce one count to robbery, a second degree felony, 
which eliminated the possibility of an enhanced penalty for use 
of a firearm under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) (R. 123-24, 
127-28). The prosecutor additionally agreed that he would take 
no position at sentencing other than if prison sentences were 
imposed, the prosecutor would recommend that they run 
concurrently (R. 31). Defendant wanted the remaining aggravated 
robbery charge restructured so that no additional term under the 
firearm enhancement provision was possible. The State agreed and 
amended the aggravated robbery count by deleting any reference to 
the use of a firearm and substituting the "serious bodily injury" 
subsection of the aggravated robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302(l)(b) (R. 29, 123-29). 
On July 16, 1990, defendant entered guilty pleas to the 
aggravated robbery of the 7-Eleven and the robbery of the Texaco 
Short Stop (R. 24, 28-33, 122-38). The pleas were entered 
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1970), 
which permits a defendant to lawfully plead guilty to a crime he 
factually did not commit to avoid risking conviction on another 
more serious charge. 
During the change of plea hearing, defendant's counsel 
informed the trial court of the reasons for the Alford pleas: 
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Your Honor, so that you'll understand the 
course of the negotiations, you will recall 
that at the time of the arraignment here 
before you we had alienists appointed to 
address certain mental competency issues. 
Those were resolved in such a way that it was 
my opinion that we did not have a legal 
defense of any form of mental impairment. 
Given that, although we did have 
substantial kinds of issues that I thought 
would be more appropriately raised with you 
at sentencing, we entered into a negotiation 
to accomplish a couple of things: one, to 
satisfy two different jurisdictions that I 
believe would be entered affecting both of 
those; secondly, to remove any type of gun 
enhancement because factually, in this case, 
there was no weapon used. There was the 
discussion about the potential of using a 
weapon, but there was no weapon used. Or, 
arguably, maybe not even a facsimile of a 
weapon. 
Also, if you'll note in the amended 
information, 900317, there was no serious 
bodily injury caused, but in order to 
completely remove the gun enhancement, in 
effect, to take away any discretion that the 
Statute might give the Court because the 
intent was that it not be there. 
. . . 
The amended information was put together 
in this fashion under an Alfred [sic] 
situation, and it's clear, and the State 
would also indicate to you, that there was no 
serious bodily injury, but in effect, this 
was the only way we could accomplish what we 
want to do and still keep it in one first 
degree felony which is what the State 
required that we do. 
Given that, the negotiation is that 
there will be a plea entered to each of these 
informations, one first degree, one second 
degree. No gun enhancement on either. And 
that Mr. Daines will be recommending at the 
time of sentencing that whatever sentence 
[sic] occurs will run concurrently. Those 
are the negotiations. 
(R. 124-126). The State concurred in these representations 
stating that its reason for doing so was defendant's "problems" 
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(R. 126). Counsel continued to explain to the court that in the 
case of the Texaco robbery, defendant used his hand as a 
"facsimile of a firearm" (R. 126). In the 7-Eleven robbery, 
counsel stated that there was no gun seen as no face-to-face 
encounter had occurred but that the threat to use a firearm had 
been conveyed by telephone (R. 127). 
The court asked defendant if he understood the 
negotiations and defendant responded, "Yes, sir, I believe I do" 
(R. 127). The court then stated: 
Okay. You understand that they're reducing 
one just to a simple robbery from — from a 
[sic] aggravated robbery where there was 
alleged to have been a weapon involved. You 
understand that if there is a weapon involved 
on an aggravated robbery, a firearm or 
facsimile of a firearm — something that 
looks like a firearm — that that [sic] 
invests in the Court the discretion of 
imposing a mandatory prison term. 
(R. 127-128). The court continued: 
In other words, that I can order that you be 
held in prison for a period of not less than 
one and it could be up to five years. 
Now, they're changing that to allege a 
simple robbery which is punishable from one 
to 15 years in the state penitentiary, and 
how much you actually — how much time you 
actually spend is up to the Board of Pardons. 
And they can presumedly, I guess, release you 
whenever they want to release you, in 
essence. 
With reference to the first degree, the 
other charge, the aggravated robbery, where 
it's alleged at the 7-Eleven, they're telling 
me that you're going to admit that you caused 
injury to somebody, but everybody agrees you 
didn't cause injury to anyone. 
The reason they want to do that is they 
want to get the weapon enhancement out of 
there, so I can't require you to spend a 
minimum of up to five years in prison. And 
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the only way they can do that is by alleging 
something that actually didn't happen. 
And they feel that this would be to your 
benefit. In other words, this is a good 
negotiation. You're getting something out of 
it, and the State's getting something out of 
it. You're getting the possibility of five 
to life, but once again, the Board of Pardons 
will determined how long you actually spend, 
whereas if I impose sentence with a weapon 
enhancement, I could require you to spend at 
least five years. 
Do you understand that? 
(R. 129-130). Defendant responded "yes" and indicated that he 
had discussed the matter with his attorney (R. 130). Defendant 
stated that he did not use an actual weapon and the court again 
explained, "I think everybody probably would not deny that that's 
the case, but you understand that if you — if there appears to 
be a weapon, that that's what we call a facsimile" (R. 130). 
Counsel repeated that in the 7-Eleven robbery, the threat of 
using a weapon was the basis for the original aggravated count 
(R. 130). 
The court proceeded with its inquiry into the voluntary 
and knowing nature of defendant's pleas to the first and second 
degree felonies (R. 130-138). No issue relating to compliance 
with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is raised in this 
appeal• 
Prior to sentencing, defendant completed a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation (R. 34-35). On November 11, 1990, 
defendant was placed on probation (R. 36-41). 
Defendant's alcohol problems continued despite his 
intensive probation and on May 20, 1991, defendant admitted to 
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violations of the terms of probation (R. 44, 49-50). Probation 
was revoked and defendant was sentenced to the statutory terms of 
imprisonment (R. 46-47; Partial Transcript of June 3, 1991 
Sentencing). No issue relating to the probation revocation is 
raised in this appeal. 
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to correct what 
he termed to be the "illegal sentence" imposed for the aggravated 
robbery conviction (R. 52). He specifically asserted that he was 
not moving to withdraw his plea to aggravated robbery but wanted 
the conviction reduced to robbery because he "did commit the 
crime of robbery a second degree felony and should be punished 
for that crime, but should not be given a greater punishment for 
a greater crime that he did not commit by Utah law" (R. 56). He 
additionally alleged that his counsel had been ineffective 
because counsel had given him bad advice concerning the 
negotiated plea (R. 56). The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding that the sentence for aggravated robbery was lawful 
and that counsel had been effective (R. 74-76). (A copy of the 
memorandum decision is attached in the addendum to this brief.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While defendant entered guilty pleas to aggravated 
robbery as a first degree felony and robbery as a second degree 
felony, only the aggravated robbery conviction is challenged on 
appeal• 
In relation to this conviction, defendant asserts that 
his sentence is "illegal" because the facts of the crime only 
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constitute robbery and that his counsel was ineffective in 
advising him to plead to aggravated robbery. The trial court 
properly rejected both arguments. 
Defendant entered a plea bargain pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The plea was entered to 
an amended information charging aggravated robbery but which 
deleted reference to firearm usage so as to avoid any possibility 
of an enhanced sentence under the firearm enhancement statute, 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1990). Defendant does not directly 
challenge the voluntary and knowing nature of his plea but 
contends that, as a matter of law, the facts would not support a 
conviction of aggravated robbery. Defendant does not seek the 
withdrawal of his plea to aggravated robbery but its reduction to 
robbery. 
Whether the facts of the crime fully support the plea 
is irrelevant to a consideration of an Alford plea. For, a 
defendant may lawfully plead guilty to a crime he did not 
factually commit to avoid risking conviction on another more 
serious charge. As long as the negotiated plea was entered with 
knowledge of its legal consequences, the plea is valid. Here, 
defendant does not claim that he failed to understand that he was 
pleading guilty to first and second degree versions of the 
robbery statutes in order to avoid enhanced penalties. As such, 
the plea to aggravated robbery is valid, irrespective of whether 
he could have been convicted of that charge. Since the sentence 
of imprisonment of five years-to-life is the statutory sentence 
12 
for aggravated robbery, the trial court correctly concluded that 
defendant's sentence is legal. 
Defendant secondarily attempts to attack the validity 
of his conviction by claiming that his counsel was ineffective in 
advising him to enter an Alford plea to aggravated robbery. To 
establish ineffectiveness in the context of a guilty plea, 
defendant must show both that the advice of his counsel 
concerning the plea was not "within the range of competency 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,11 and that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 59 (1985) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)). The trial 
court correctly concluded that the facts alleged by the State 
provided a legal basis for the charges and, therefore, defense 
counsel's plea negotiation to minimize the applicable penalties 
was not deficient. 
Further, defendant asserts that he does not wish either 
of his pleas to be withdrawn but only seeks the reduction of the 
aggravated robbery conviction to robbery, a charge defendant 
admits that he would have pleaded guilty to under any 
circumstances. In essence, defendant is claiming that he is 
entitled to a better plea bargain. Therefore, even assuming 
arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient, defendant^has 
failed to establish prejudice in the sixth amendment sense. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS-TO-LIFE ON 
HIS CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS 
LAWFUL 
Defendant has consistently stated that he is not 
attempting to withdraw his guilty pleas or otherwise vacate the 
pleas as involuntarily or unknowingly entered (Br. of Appellant 
at 19, 21; R. 56, 58). Instead, defendant claims that his 
aggravated robbery conviction should be reduced to robbery, as a 
matter of law, in that he "should not be given a greater 
punishment for a greater crime that he did not commit by Utah 
law" (Brief of App. at 19; R. 56). No issue is raised concerning 
the validity of defendant's second conviction for robbery. 
Citing rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(allowing correction of an "illegal" sentence at any time), 
defendant's first ground for reduction of his conviction is that 
the sentence for aggravated robbery is unlawful (Br. of App. at 
4-5; R. 52-56). As the trial court correctly concluded, this 
argument is meritless (R. 74-76). (See addendum for a copy of 
the memorandum decision denying defendant's motion.) So long as 
defendant's plea to aggravated robbery is valid, the legal 
sentence of imprisonment is five years-to-life. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302(2) (1990) (designating aggravated robbery as a first 
degree felony); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1990) (providing 
that the statutory penalty for conviction of a first degree 
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felony is imprisonment for five years-to-life). (The full text 
of all statutory provisions is set forth, supra, at 2-4.) 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, due process does 
not preclude a defendant from entering a guilty plea to a crime 
for which he could not be convicted and factually did not commit. 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1970); Hurst v. 
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989). Here, the record clearly 
reflects that defendant's pleas to the amended charges of 
aggravated robbery and robbery were entered pursuant to Alford to 
avoid the possibility of imposition of mandatory enhanced 
penalties if the trial court found that a "firearm or a facsimile 
or representation of a firearm" had been used in the commission 
of either robbery (R. 123-30). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203. 
It is also unchallenged that defendant was informed of the 
applicable penalties for the first and second degree felony 
offenses to which he was pleading (R. 28-29, 128-30). Since the 
record establishes that defendant understood the consequences of 
his Alford plea to aggravated robbery, he is not now entitled to 
a lesser sentence or to withdraw his plea on the basis that he 
did not factually commit the crime to which he pled. Hurst, 777 
P.2d at 1038. It is sufficient that the plea, entered to avoid 
the possibility of a harsher sentence, is of the same genre of 
crime of which he was originally charged and does not distort the 
nature of the criminal conduct involved. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 
1038. 
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Defendant received the benefit of his bargain. The 
court specified in the judgment that defendant was not subject to 
an enhanced penalty for firearm usage and defendant has received 
none (R. 39)* By limiting the State's position at sentencing and 
admitting his general culpability and need for treatment, 
defendant was successful in initially avoiding prison and 
receiving probation. This opportunity to address his alcohol 
problems was another of the admitted goals in entering the pleas 
(R. 25-26/ 38-41f 125). The benefit defendant received by the 
plea bargain was only undone by defendant when he violated his 
probation and the now challenged sentence of imprisonment was 
imposed (Br. of App. at 1; R. 44). However, since the five-to-
life sentence does not exceed the sentence statutorily proscribed 
for aggravated robbery and no abuse of discretion is otherwise 
alleged, the sentence is valid. State v. Ford, 818 P.2d 1052/ 
1054-55 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987f 
988 (Utah 1986)). Accord Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1038. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL IN ENTERING HIS NEGOTIATED GUILTY 
PLEA TO AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
While defendant labeled his motion as a "Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence/1' the trial court correctly realized 
that defendant was actually alleging that his counsel was 
ineffective in advising him to plead guilty (R. 75; addendum). 
For this reasonf the trial court ignored the caption of 
defendant's motion and apparently treated the argument as a 
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petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (id.)* See State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 
473-74 (Utah App. 1991) (a defendant who asserts that he should 
not have been convicted of a certain degree of crime is not 
alleging that his sentence is illegal but that his conviction 
should be vacated). The court explicitly declined to rule on any 
applicable procedural bar and simply considered the merits of 
defendant's pro se argument (R. 75). Because the merits of the 
ineffectiveness claim were reviewed below, the State will address 
this argument on appeal. ££. State v. Belcrard. 830 P.2d 264, 266 
(Utah 1992) (the trial court's disregard of a procedural bar and 
ruling on the merits of a claim preserves the issue for 
appeal).l 
To prove ineffectiveness of counsel in connection with 
the entry of a guilty plea, a defendant must establish not only 
that the advice of his counsel was not "within the range of 
competency demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," but also 
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
1
 Defendant also summarily alleges that "[f]or the prosecutor 
to push the greater punishment for his own gain was a violation of 
the eighth and fourteenth amendments" (Br. of App. at 19; R. 56). 
Presumptively, this is the same argument that defendant advances in 
support of his ineffectiveness claim: As a matter of law, there 
was no basis for the aggravated charges or potential firearm 
enhancements. Implicitly, the trial court rejected this argument 
in concluding that a legal basis existed for the charges (R. 75). 
For purposes of this brief, no separate analysis is required. If 
a legal basis exists for the charges such that defendant's counsel 
was effective, necessarily there was no misconduct in prosecuting 
the charges. 
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on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57, 59 
(1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 
(1984)). 
Defendant claims that his counsel rendered bad advice, 
and presumedly deficient performance, by advising him that he 
could be lawfully charged with two aggravated robbery counts and 
potentially faced mandatory penalty enhancements based on his 
threats of use of a firearm in the 7-Eleven robbery and his use 
of his hand to create the impression of a weapon in the Texaco 
robbery. The difficulty with defendant's argument is that if he 
established the constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel, his 
pleas should be vacated and the matter remanded for trial on the 
original charges. Id. Yet, defendant seeks only to reduce the 
7-Eleven aggravated robbery conviction to robbery and leave the 
Texaco robbery conviction undisturbed. Defendant concedes that, 
irrespective of the advice of counsel, he would not have 
proceeded to trial and would have simply insisted on a better 
plea bargain (Br. of App, at 2-3, 19, 21). 
In this framework, the issues are: Was defendant's 
counsel's advice regarding the acceptance or rejection of the 
proposed Alford plea bargain within the range of competency 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases? And if not, can 
prejudice as defined under the sixth amendment be found where 
defendant does not claim that, but for the deficient performance, 
he would have proceeded to trial? 
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The sixth amendment guarantee of a fair trial does not 
extend to fair plea bargains. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 
1068 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 
1985) and State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987)). 
For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court has declined to address 
claims of ineffectiveness predicated on counsel's performance in 
the plea bargain process unless the claim of deficient 
performance concerns counsel's failure to do an act procedurally 
required. Id. 
Here, defendant argues that counsel's interpretation of 
the applicable statutory law was incorrect and, therefore, his 
advice regarding the benefits of the plea bargain was deficient 
(Br. of App. at 19-21; R. 56-57).2 But, an attorney's errors in 
judgment concerning the strength of the case or likelihood of 
conviction are matters of trial strategy and tactics generally 
exempted from sixth amendment scrutiny. Colonna, 766 P.2d at 
1066. Only where there is no "tactical or strategic 
justification for his conduct of the trial" will the error in 
judgment be considered constitutionally deficient. Id.. In the 
context of plea negotiations, this exemption is strictly applied 
and appellate courts will generally refuse to review the "skill 
and competency of counsel in the negotiation process or in advice 
2
 The record does not contain the specific advice given 
defendant by counsel. However, it is evident that counsel believed 
that the State's evidence could support the charges (R. 123-30). 
It is also clear that counsel recognized that an argument existed 
that no "facsimile" had been used (R. 125). 
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given regarding the acceptance or rejection of a proposed plea 
bargain." 3x1. at 1068. 
The trial court, however, considered the claim on the 
merits by analyzing whether, as a matter of law, the alleged 
conduct fell within the aggravated robbery and penalty 
enhancement provisions (R. 75; addendum). If the informations 
were supportable, then counsel was effective in negotiating the 
pleas; if not, the plea bargain was merely illusory.3 
The trial court concluded that the 1989 amended 
aggravated robbery statute included a threat to use a firearm 
without proof of the actual existence of a weapon (R. 75). 
Implicitly, the court found that either the use of defendant's 
hand to create the facsimile of a weapon during the Texaco 
robbery or the oral representation that a firearm would be used 
in the 7-Eleven robbery, provided a basis for possible firearm 
enhancement penalties (R. 75, 127-30). Since there existed a 
legal basis for the charges, the trial court concluded: 
The negotiation to remove a firearms 
enhancement and an Alford plea based upon 
that consideration therefore would be 
effective and not subject to challenge at 
this stage. 
(R. 75; addendum). 
Defendant challenges the trial court's conclusion by 
citing State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), and State v. 
Hartman, 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that a 
3
 While defendant only directly attacks the aggravated robbery 
conviction, the circumstances surrounding both pleas must be 
considered in any evaluation of the plea bargain. 
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verbal threat to use a firearm cannot support an "aggravated" 
charge unless the threat is made in a face-to-face encounter (Br. 
of App. at 10-14). Similarly, defendant argues that the use of 
his hand to represent a firearm cannot support an "aggravated" 
charge unless the hand gesture is accompanied with a threat to 
use a dangerous weapon (id.). Defendant's argument is not 
supported by the language of the current statutes. 
In Suniville, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a 
verbal threat to use a weapon, without more, did not constitute 
aggravated robbery. 741 P.2d at 965. This interpretation was 
dictated and limited by the language of the then existing 
statute, which read: 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (1978). The court opined that if 
the legislature had intended a verbal threat to constitute 
aggravated robbery, the legislature would have added language 
focusing on the perception of the victim who is threatened with a 
concealed weapon rather than language exclusively limited to the 
nature of the weapon used. Suniville, 741 P.2d at 963-64. 
Just such a subjective approach was adopted in 1989. 
In response to Suniville, the legislature amended the aggravated 
robbery statute to read, in pertinent part: 
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A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1990) (italics added). 
At the same time, the legislature amended the statutory 
definition of dangerous weapon. Prior to 1989, a deadly or 
dangerous weapon had been defined as "anything that in the manner 
of its use or intended use is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (1978). But with 
the inclusion of "threats" in the amended aggravated robbery 
statute, the legislature now defined dangerous weapon to include 
any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury or "a 
facsimile or representation" of such an item and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use 
of the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1990). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, in expanding the 
scope of the aggravated robbery statute to include "threats to 
use a dangerous weapon," the Utah legislature clearly intended to 
include any "expression of an intention to inflict injury on 
another" whether communicated by action, conduct or words. State 
v. Hartman, 783 P.2d at 546. Under the subjective approach, the 
determining factor is not limited to whether the perpetrator 
actually uses or displays a weapon; the aggravated element may be 
predicated simply on the fear instilled in the victim by the 
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threat to use such a weapon. Id. at 547. Accord State v. Adams, 
830 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah App. 1992) ("[tjhreatening to use a 
dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery, regardless 
of whether one actually possesses such a weapon, is sufficient 
for a charge of aggravated robbery"). 
Despite the plain language of the statutes and the 
Hartman-Adams' holdings, defendant argues that only a face-to-
face threat will support an aggravated robbery charge. But the 
language of the current statutes negate this contention. 
Aggravated robbery is defined as including (1) incidents where 
the robber's use or apparent intended use of a dangerous weapon 
or its "facsimile or representation" "leads the victim to 
reasonably believe" the item may be used, or (2) incidents where 
the robber represents to the victim, by words or conduct, that he 
is in control of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-302 
and 76-1-601(5). In either situation, the actual observation or 
existence of the weapon is immaterial. Adams, 830 P.2d at 313. 
In interpreting the pre-1989 statutes, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that "facsimile" means no more than its 
dictionary meaning of "making a copy, imitation." State v. 
Turner, 572 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1977). No Utah case has 
interpreted "representation" in the robbery weapon context. 
However, following the Turner approach, "representation" should 
be interpreted by its dictionary meaning as "a statement of 
facts, allegations or arguments, especially one intended to 
influence action, persuade hearers, make protest." Webster's New 
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World Dictionary. Applying these definitions, use of a dangerous 
weapon includes use of a real weapon, use of a copy or imitation 
of such a weapon, and statements and conduct which convey that 
the perpetrator has such a weapon. Accord In Re R.D.S, 777 P.2d 
532, 537 (Utah App. 1989) (statutory language should be given its 
"ordinary, plain meaning" ); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 
428, 430 (Utah 1989) ("in construing a statute, all words are 
presumed to have been used advisedly and that construction is 
favored which gives effect to all of its provisions"). 
Similarly, defendant contends his conduct, as a matter 
of law, could not justify the imposition of penalty enhancements 
for use of a firearm and, therefore, his counsel was deficient 
for considering the impact of enhanced penalties during the plea 
negotiations. Defendant's argument is essentially the same as 
discussed above in that he claims that the firearm enhancement 
provision is inapplicable where there is no proof of the use of 
an actual weapon. Like the dangerous weapon statute, the penalty 
enhancement provision uses the terms "firearm or a facsimile or 
the representation of a firearm." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 
(1990) (See complete text, supra, at 3-4). For the reasons 
previously discussed, the use of the term "representation" 
includes within it, verbal and physical actions of the robber 
which convey that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. 
Since the State's evidence supported the aggravated 
charges and exposed defendant to possible increased penalties for 
firearm usage, the trial court properly concluded that 
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defendant's counsel was effective for entering into plea 
negotiations. Given the evidence, including defendant's 
confessions and lack of defense (R. 124), and his wish to "get 
his life straighten out" (R.25-26), counsel reasonably minimized 
defendant's criminal exposure. 
Defendant has not established that counsel's assistance 
in the ensuing Alford pleas was ineffective or that defendant has 
been prejudiced in any constitutional sense. Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. at 59. Since the guilty pleas obtained lesser sentences 
that he would have received if convicted as charged, defendant 
"received what he bargained for." Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1038. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and 
sentence for aggravated robbery should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q/Qttay of November, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General-^ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UT^£ jy^ \l fid 9 UO 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
\ 
\ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DOUGLAS A. CATTELAN, Case No. 901900317 
JUN 1 2 1992 Defendant. 
Defendant's motion to correct a sentence is denied. 
Factually, the defendant's motion arises from a plea 
negotiation. He had been charged with an Aggravated Robbery 
through the threatened use of a firearm. That charge had been 
amended to allege instead "serious bodily injury" to avoid the 
firearms enhancement which was attendant to the prior charge. 
The defendant entered an "Alford" plea to that charge, based 
upon the fact that everyone had agreed, no one had been 
injured. 
The Court had in due course sentenced the defendant to a 
term in prison of 5 years to life. 
The defendant believes that sentence should be corrected 
to reflect a second degree felony, since that is the offense 
which he felt the state could prove. 
The Court cannot correct that sentence, since 5 years to 
life is appropriate for the charge for which he stands convicted. 
0)74 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 901900317 
Page 2 
The inquiry does not conclude at that point in view of 
the defendant's concern with the negotiation. If the offense he 
committed was a Second Degree Felony and in the negotiation he 
pled to a First Degree, that may well constitute grounds for 
concern. 
The State alleged that the defendant called the victim on 
the phone and told him he had a gun pointed at his head and if 
he didn't put money and merchandise outside by a dumpster he 
would kill him. While the defendant denied that statement, that 
was the basis for the States filing of the Aggravated Robbery 
charge. The question is whether the mere threat of the use of a 
firearm is sufficient to make a case of Aggravated Robbery, or 
if the State's burden would require some evidence of the actual 
existence of a firearm. 
The Court concludes in view of the history of the section 
in question, the threat of use of a firearm is sufficient to 
make out an Aggravated Robbery. The negotiation to remove a 
firearms enhancement and an Alford plea based upon that 
consideration therefore would be effective and not subject to 
challenge at this stage. 
In view of this ruling the court has not considered the 
procedural aspects relating to the defendant's motion. 
DATED this LL day of June, 1992* 
